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How Did We Get Here Anyway?:
Considering the Standing Question in
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN*
In Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., the Sixth Circuit simultaneously invalidated an
Ohio investment tax credit as inconsistent with the "dormant Commerce Clause" of
the United States Constitution and upheld a local personal property tax waiver against
a similar challenge by a group of Ohio and Michigan taxpayers.1 Academics and
other experts have extensively debated the relationship between state tax incentive
programs like these and the Commerce Clause. Several articles, including some in
this series of essays, specifically discuss the merits and implications of the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Cuno.3 As I have discussed the Cuno decision with colleagues
unfamiliar with these debates, however, the question invariably raised has been, "How
did the plaintiffs establish standing?"
The Supreme Court has seen the elephant in the middle of the room. In
granting the petitions of DaimlerChrysler and various state and local govem-
ment defendants for review of the Ohio investment tax credit piece of the Cuno
case, the Supreme Court directed the parties to brief and argue the question,
"Whether respondents have standing to challenge Ohio's investment tax credit."4
At the same time, the Court thus far has declined to decide whether to grant or
deny certiorari to Charlotte Cuno and her fellow plaintiffs on the corresponding
local personal property tax waiver question. In pursuing this path, I believe the
Court is sending a signal that it finds the Sixth Circuit decision troubling but
hopes to dispose of it on standing grounds and avoid the Commerce Clause
issue entirely. Yet, in all the discussion of Cuno, the standing question has been
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Many thanks to Brannon
Denning, Heidi Kitrosser, David Stras, and Donald Tobin for helpful comments and to Sarah Bunce for
excellent research assistance.
1. 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004).
2. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REV. 377 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette, Business
Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REv. 447 (1997); Walter
Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives,
81 CORNELL L. REv. 789 (1996); Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress
Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171 (1997); Edward R. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause:
The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29
Onto N.U. L. REv. 29 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Ohio Incentives Decision Revisited, 37 ST. TAX NoTEs 859 (Sept.
19, 2005); Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, Litigation and Tax Incentives After the Downfall of Ohio's
ITC, 34 ST. TAX NoTEs 367, 367-68 (May 2, 2005); Timothy H. Gillis, Sixth Circuit Bans Ohio Tax
Credit Under the Commerce Clause, Casting a Pall on Incentives, 101 J. TAX'N 359 (2004); Matt
Kitchen, Comment and Casenote, The Ohio Investment Tax Credit: Impermissible Burden or Necessary
Benefit? Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1685 (2005).
4. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. v. Cuno, 126 S.Ct. 36 (2005) (order granting petition for certiorari).
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woefully neglected. This essay seeks to fill that void.
Standing doctrine includes both constitutional and prudential aspects. Consti-
tutional standing doctrine derives from Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion, which limits federal court jurisdiction to "cases" or "controversies."5
While the courts often struggle in determining whether particular plaintiffs
satisfy the Article HI case or controversy requirement, the Supreme Court has
articulated the standard for that inquiry. To demonstrate constitutional standing
to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) that
she has suffered an "injury in fact," (2) that there is a causal connection between
the injury suffered and the conduct that gives rise to her complaint, and (3) that
a decision by the courts in her favor will likely redress that injury. The injury in
question must be "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent," as
opposed to "conjectural or hypothetical"; the injury must be "fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant"; and the ability of the court to redress
the injury must be "likely, as opposed to merely speculative."7
Beyond these constitutional standing requirements, however, the courts have
also recognized certain prudential limitations on plaintiff standing in federal
court.
"[Prudential] standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed lim-
its on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone
of interests protected by the law invoked."8
Lawsuits premised upon taxpayer status are perhaps the most common example
of generalized grievances lacking standing; but the "zone of interests" require-
ment imposes a further burden on plaintiffs alleging the illegality of government
action to show that the interests they assert fall within the protective zone of the
constitutional or statutory provision on which they base their claim.9
Standing doctrine plays an important role in a system of government that
divides power among three co-equal branches and dual sovereigns.)0 Both
Article III and prudential standing requirements serve the federal judiciary by
5. U.S. CONST. art. Im, § 2, ci. 1.
6. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000);
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992).
7. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81.
8. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
9. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
10. See, e.g., ERWiN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JuRisDICToIN § 2.3.1 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing values of
limiting standing). But see generally David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of
Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CoRNmLL L. REv. 808 (2004) (criticizing
modem standing doctrine); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988)
(same).
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limiting its jurisdiction to actual disputes between parties that judges are
particularly equipped to resolve. Standing doctrine also prevents the judiciary
from intruding too deeply into matters of policy better left to the states or the
political branches of the federal government. In short, the federal courts have
eschewed, whether for constitutional or prudential reasons, "appeals to their
authority which would convert the judicial process into 'no more than a vehicle
for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders."
1
'
Although the Cuno plaintiffs face a number of possible problems in satisfying
these requirements, the Cuno case particularly implicates a longstanding rift
among the circuits over the kind and degree of injury that a state taxpayer must
establish. Standing doctrine is quite clear on the standards for evaluating
taxpayer challenges to both federal and municipal government action. Longstand-
ing jurisprudence renders it virtually impossible for federal taxpayers to estab-
lish standing but comparatively simple for municipal taxpayers to pass that
hurdle. 12 The circuits are divided, however, over whether and when a taxpayer
may challenge state laws in federal court. Put simply, the circuits disagree over
whether states should be treated more like the federal government or like
municipalities in evaluating taxpayer standing.
While it is likely that the Court recognizes the enormous economic implica-
tions of the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the Commerce Clause in Cuno, 
3
the Court's approach to the Cuno case thus far-leaving the Cuno plaintiffs'
petition on the personal property tax waiver pending while ordering the parties
to brief the standing question-suggests that the Court may be looking for a
way to dodge that issue yet nevertheless reverse the Sixth Circuit. The Court
could kill two birds with one stone by using Cuno as a vehicle to resolve the
circuit split over state taxpayer standing and overturn the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion on that basis while avoiding the Commerce Clause issue altogether.
Alternatively, the Court could duck both the Commerce Clause issue and the
circuit split over state taxpayer standing and still reverse the Sixth Circuit on
other standing grounds. Either way, it seems most likely that the Court will
reverse the Sixth Circuit and resolve the Cuno case by concluding that Charlotte
Cuno and her fellow plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims in federal
court.
BACKGROUND
As the foreword to this series of essays lays out in more detail, the origin of
the plaintiffs' claim is in a series of agreements between DaimlerChrysler and
the City of Toledo and local school districts. Those agreements provided for
11. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464,473 (1982) (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
12. See infra, notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
13. See Kristin E. Hickman & Sarah L. Bunce, Foreword: DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno and the
Constitutionality of State Tax Incentives for Economic Development, 4 GEo. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 15 (2006).
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DaimlerChrysler to undertake certain construction and improvements to its
facilities in Toledo in exchange for various governmental promises, including
but not limited to a ten-year abatement of personal property taxes on new
manufacturing equipment installed as part of the project and assistance in
qualifying for a 13.5% investment tax credit against DaimlerChrysler's Ohio
franchise tax obligation. 14
The Cuno plaintiffs' original complaint raised several claims against a large
number of defendants, including not only DaimlerChrysler but also the State of
Ohio, City of Toledo, two local school districts, and various officials from each
of those governmental entities. 15 The complaint is complex from a standing
perspective, given the number of plaintiffs and defendants and the variety of
claims brought and injuries alleged.
All of the plaintiffs resident in Ohio (referred to in the district court record as
the "Ohio plaintiffs") filed their complaint collectively as citizens and taxpayers
of the City of Toledo and the State of Ohio. The Ohio plaintiffs alleged that the
tax subsidies granted to DaimlerChrysler deprived their state and local govern-
ments of tax revenues that otherwise would have been available for other lawful
uses and also shifted to these plaintiffs as taxpayers a "disproportionate burden
of supporting" such governmental functions. 16 Separately, one Ohio plaintiff,
Kim's Auto and Truck Services, Inc., also alleged that its business had to be
relocated under the threat of eminent domain,' 7 that this dislocation caused
Kim's to lose profits,' 8 and that the move would have been unnecessary but for
the tax incentives offered to DaimlerChrysler.' 9
Other plaintiffs resident in Michigan (the "Michigan plaintiffs") similarly
relied on their status as taxpayers as the foundation for their claims. The
14. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9-10, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., No.
C10200002084 (Lucas Co., Ohio Mar. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Complaint]. The complaint referenced the
agreement between the City and DaimlerChrysler, which included agreements on the part of the city to
perform all of the site preparation and obtain agreements with local school districts to maximize
property tax relief. See id. at ex. A.
15. Beyond the dormant Commerce Clause challenges to the Ohio investment tax credit and
personal property tax waiver provisions of the Ohio Revenue Code, the original complaint also alleged
that these state statutes violate the equal protection clause of the Ohio Constitution and that some or all
of the parties failed to satisfy statutory eligibility requirements for the personal property tax exemption.
See Complaint, supra note 14, at 8-20. The plaintiffs dropped the statutory eligibility requirement issue
on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, see Brief of Appellants at 4-5, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d
738 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 01-3960); and the plaintiffs further did not appeal the equal protection issue to
the Supreme Court. See Petition of Charlotte Cuno for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler,
Inc., No. 04-1407 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2005), 2005 WL 952245. Because the petitions for certiorari raised
only the Commerce Clause issue, this discussion of the standing question is likewise limited.
16. Complaint, supra note 14, at 11.
17. See id. at 6.
18. See id. at 11.
19. More precisely, the complaint alleges "loss of income from temporary closure due to being
moved" as well as a variety of more generalized business impediments such as "temporary shutdowns,"
"loss of business visibility," and "loss of business customers" that are presumably intended to convey
lost profits. See id.
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Michigan plaintiffs alleged that, but for the tax incentives provided to Daimler-
Chrysler by the other defendants, DaimlerChrysler might have located its new
facilities in Michigan rather than Ohio.2° If DaimlerChrysler had located its new
facilities in Michigan, then Michigan and the municipalities thereunder would
have received more tax revenues from the resulting jobs and economic develop-
ment, and the Michigan plaintiffs would have benefited from the utilization of
those funds by those governments. The Michigan plaintiffs assert the depriva-
tion of these benefits as the injury they have suffered.21
Regardless of the injuries alleged, the remedies sought are the same for each
count. Specifically, the plaintiffs ask that the provisions of the Ohio Revenue
Code permitting the property tax exemption and the investment tax credit be
declared unconstitutional and that preliminary and permanent injunctions against
their operation be granted.22 The plaintiffs also request attorney fees and court
costs incurred in connection with the suit.
23
The Supreme Court is not the first court to consider the standing issue in the
Cuno case. The plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in Ohio state court.2 4
The defendants removed the case to federal district court, 5 after which the
plaintiffs moved to have it remanded back to state court.26 In arguing for
remand, the plaintiffs maintained that a lack of clarity in federal standing
doctrine meant that someone, at some point in the litigation, would raise a
standing challenge. 7
As the district court observed, the motion to remand on standing grounds
yielded awkward arguments from both sides.28 While the plaintiffs explicitly
denied that they lacked standing to bring their claims in federal court, they
nevertheless contended that the district court should remand the case to avoid
the standing question entirely.2 9 The Ohio state defendants contended that most
of the plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims in federal court yet opposed
the remand motion on the ground that a single plaintiff, Kim's Auto and Truck
Service, raised a colorable argument to support its standing to challenge the
decision by the City of Toledo and relevant local school board to grant the
20. See id. at 11-12.
21. See id.
22. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 13-14, 19.
23. See id.
24. See Complaint, supra note 14.
25. Notice of Removal, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (No.
3:00CV7247).
26. Plaintiffs' Motion For Remand to State Court, or Alternatively, For Abstention and Remand,
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (No. 3:00CV7247) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs'Motion For Remand].
27. Plaintiffs'Motion For Remand, supra note 26, at 7.
28. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion For Remand at 5-6, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (No. 3:00CV7247) [hereinafter Order Denying Remand].
29. Plaintiffs'Motion For Remand, supra note 26, at 7-9.
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personal property tax exemption to DaimlerChrysler. 30 Similarly, DaimlerChrys-
ler and the other defendants never conceded outright the plaintiffs' standing to
raise all of their claims in federal court. Instead, these defendants took the
overall position that the plaintiffs' "case for federal standing is actually stronger
in important respects" than their state standing posture, and then focused their
argument on only two of the many claims.31 Specifically, DaimlerChrysler and
the other defendants acknowledged that the Ohio plaintiffs' status as municipal
taxpayers would be sufficient for the personal property tax challenge.32 On the
investment tax credit, these defendants also contended that Kim's Auto and
Truck Services raised allegations of economic injury adequate to establish
standing.33
In denying the plaintiffs' motion for remand, the district court concluded that,
at a minimum, the Ohio plaintiffs had standing as municipal taxpayers to
challenge the property tax exemption as reducing tax revenues available to their
respective local school districts, an injury that the district court presumed would
be redressed by invalidating the statute (and thus the waiver of taxes otherwise
owed). 34 On that basis alone, the district court claimed jurisdiction and pro-
ceeded to resolve all of the plaintiffs' claims by dismissing all counts for failure
to state a claim.35
The standing issue was not raised on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. That court
agreed with the District Court's dismissal of the personal property tax waiver
but invalidated the investment tax credit provision as violating the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. Both sides of the case petitioned the
Supreme Court for review of the Sixth Circuit judgment against them, thereby
splitting the personal property tax waiver and the investment tax credit into two
separate petitions. The Supreme Court, in turn, only granted certiorari with
respect to the investment tax credit. The Court thus has left to the side, at least
30. Memorandum of State Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Remand at 9, 12,
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (No. 3:00CV7247). Although
the state defendants posit outright that the Michigan plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to raise any
of their claims and that the Ohio plaintiffs cannot use their status as state taxpayers to obtain
constitutional standing, most of the state defendants' brief on the standing issue is dedicated to
discussing which standing requirements various plaintiffs can establish. The state defendants acknowl-
edge that the Ohio plaintiffs satisfy constitutional standing requirements as municipal taxpayers to
challenge the decision by the City of Toledo and their respective school boards to grant the personal
property tax exemption to DaimlerChrysler; but the state defendants admit only the possibility that
Kim's Auto and Truck Service might be able to meet prudential standing requirements on its Commerce
Clause claim. See id. at 7-14.
31. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Remand at 12-21, Cuno v.
DaimilerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (No. 3:00CV7247).
32. Id. at 14-17.
33. Id. at 18. DaimlerChrysler and the other non-state defendants also suggested that the injury of
depleted taxpayer funds alleged by all of the Ohio plaintiffs might be adequate to confer standing. See
id. at 15. These defendants limited their standing argument to injury-in-fact, however, and did not at
any time analyze the causation and redressability elements of constitutional standing doctrine.
34. Order Denying Remand, supra note 28, at 6-7.
35. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F Supp. 2d 1196, 1203-04 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
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for now, the personal property tax waiver on which the district court predicated
its jurisdiction.
As highlighted by the posture of the case now before the Supreme Court, the
problem with the district court's approach in evaluating the standing issue is
that the property tax exemption on which the district court premised jurisdiction
is not the part of the case that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear.36 The issue
before the Court is whether Kim's Auto and Truck Services, the other Ohio
plaintiffs as Ohio state citizens and taxpayers, and the Michigan plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the investment tax credit provision
of the Ohio Revenue Code.3 7
INJURY-IN-FACT AND TAXPAYER STANDING
In general, the injury-in-fact element of constitutional standing requires a
plaintiff to show that it has suffered an "invasion of a legally protected interest
... in a personal and individual way."'38 As DaimlerChrysler argued before the
district court, Kim's Auto and Truck Services likely has pleaded facts sufficient
to satisfy the injury-in-fact element for constitutional standing. Kim's alleges a
specific if undenominated financial injury in the form of lost profits incurred as
a result of having to relocate its business from property condemned and
transferred to DaimlerChrysler for redevelopment. Kim's claim, if true, thus
articulates the sort of direct and individualized economic injury adequate to
establish injury-in-fact. 39 Kim's does not seek compensation for these losses in
the Cuno case; but while that failure bears on the redressability issue discussed
below, it does not impact the injury-in-fact analysis.
By contrast, it is difficult to imagine any scenario in which the Michigan
plaintiffs can establish injury-in-fact. The only injury asserted by the Michigan
plaintiffs-that they were denied the benefits of spending their state and munici-
pal governments might have undertaken had DaimlerChrysler chosen to invest
and paid taxes in Michigan rather than Ohio-is the very picture of the sort of
generalized, abstract, and conjectural injury that the injury-in-fact inquiry re-
36. Even if the Court had agreed to consider the property tax waiver, the Court could still raise the
question of standing with respect to the Ohio investment tax credit issue. But if the district court was
correct in its assessment that Kim's Auto and Truck Services had municipal taxpayer standing to
challenge the personal property tax waiver, then Kim's arguably might be able to bring in the Ohio
investment tax credit issue as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2005);
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 832 n.27 (5th
Cir. 1998). As noted below, however, I believe the district court erred in characterizing Kim's claims as
municipal rather than state taxpayer actions. See discussion infra note 106. All of the remaining claims
raised by the plaintiffs before the district court were state statutory and constitutional claims over which
the federal courts would not ordinarily have primary jurisdiction.
37. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615-16 (1989) (emphasizing the need to establish
standing separately for each plaintiff or group of plaintiffs).
38. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992).
39. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)
(recognizing standing to sue for lost profits); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 520-21 (1912) (conferring
standing upon plaintiff complaining of lost sales).
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jects.40 The Michigan plaintiffs highlight their taxpayer status, but they are
taxpayers of Michigan suing Ohio and its officials as well as private parties.
Consequently, the Michigan plaintiffs cannot even cast their claim as one of
taxpayers challenging the wrongdoing of their own government. The Michigan
plaintiffs simply have presented no cognizable injury to sustain their cause.
Evaluating the standing of the remaining Ohio plaintiffs is more difficult. For
these plaintiffs, the three-part test for constitutional standing is barely a starting
point for analyzing their case. The Ohio plaintiffs allege as their sole injury the
investment tax credit's "effect of reducing the funds available for the operation
of' the City of Toledo and the local school districts, which effect the Ohio
plaintiffs also characterize as shifting to them "a disproportionate burden of
supporting these governmental functions. 41 With regard to these plaintiffs,
therefore, Cuno is primarily a case of parties suing as citizens and taxpayers of
the State of Ohio. Standing doctrine poses a significant, though not insurmount-
able, hurdle for any plaintiff who sues in either of these capacities.
Federal and Municipal Taxpayer Standing
As a rule, the Court does not recognize a plaintiff who contests government
action merely on the basis of her citizenship without some more concrete and
particularized injury.42 Similarly, long before articulating its modern test for
constitutional standing, the Court in Frothingham v. Mellon held that federal
taxpayers do not, merely through that status, possess standing to challenge the
constitutionality of federal statutes.4 3 While even a small injury may be enough
to confer standing upon a plaintiff if it is direct and individualized, an the interest
of a taxpayer in the federal treasury is "generalized," "remote," "indetermin-
able," and "shared with millions of others," so is inadequate for standing
purposes.45
Frothingham predates by several decades the Court's current three-part test
for constitutional standing and is often characterized as implicating only pruden-
tial concerns and not Article III standing requirements.46 Nevertheless, Frothing-
40. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-78 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754-55 (1984); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
41. Complaint, supra note 14, at 11.
42. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64-66 (1997); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 178 (1974); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 754 ("This Court has repeatedly held that an
asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to
confer jurisdiction on a federal court.").
43. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-89 (1923). Frothingham is a companion case to
Massachusetts v. Mellon. While Frothingham v. Mellon involved an individual taxpayer suit against a
federal statute, Massachusetts v. Mellon concerned a challenge by the state of Massachusetts against the
same statute. See id. at 480.
44. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 683-90 & n.14 (1973).
45. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487-88.
46. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 497 n.8, 499 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 & n.6 (1968); see also Nancy C. Staudt,
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ham's holding reconciles easily with the injury-in-fact prong of the constitutional
standing inquiry when read to say that the economic injury of increased taxes
suffered by a federal taxpayer from allegedly illegal congressional action is
simply not enough of an injury to confer standing.47
In Flast v. Cohen, however, the Court adopted one exception from the
Frothingham rule on taxpayer standing where "there is a logical nexus between
the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated., 48 This "logical
nexus test" holds that the otherwise generalized, remote, and indeterminable
injury suffered by federal taxpayers will be adequate to support federal jurisdic-
tion where (1) the allegedly unconstitutional act is an exercise of Congress's
taxing and spending power under Article I, section 8 of the United States
Constitution and (2) the violation in question implicates a specific constitutional
limitation imposed upon that power.49 The logical nexus test only applies where
Congress has exercised its taxing and spending power, as opposed to any of its
various other Article I powers. 50 In addition, while the Flast Court recognized
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause as limiting Congress's taxing and
spending power, in almost forty years of subsequent jurisprudence, the Court
has shown no inclination to recognize any other constitutional provision as
imposing like restraint, at least for purposes of taxpayer standing.5' Moreover,
in adopting a more lenient view of taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause
cases, the Court has not exempted such plaintiffs from the Article III standing
requirements of causation and redressability.52 The result is that very few
Modeling Standing, 79 NYU L. REv. 612, 627 n.70 (2004); Georgene M. Vairo, Selected Problems in
Federal Jurisdiction: Standing, Implied Rights of Action, Pendent Jurisdiction, and Abstention, C607
ALI-ABA 363, 369 (1991); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1378-79 (1988). But see CHEMRINSKY, supra note 10, § 2.3.5, at
95 (linking taxpayer standing cases and injury-in-fact element).
47. See, e.g., Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing
Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 792 & n. 107 (2003) (suggesting a potential Article III connection).
48. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618-20 (1988); Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03.
50. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982) (ruling taxpayers did not have standing to challenge a decision by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
210-11, 227-28 (1974) (denying standing for taxpayers raising challenge under Article I, section 6
Incompatibility Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1974) (denying standing
when taxpayer challenged statutes regulating the CIA as violating Article I, section 9 Accounts Clause).
51. "Although we have considered the problem of standing and Article III limitations on federal
jurisdiction many times since [Flast ], we have consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow exception
it created to the general rule against taxpayer standing established in Frothingham .. " Bowen, 487
U.S. at 618. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, § 2.3; 13 C. WRoH, A. MiLER, & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRAcncE AND P~ocEDuRE § 3531.1, at 367 (1982) ("Fate has not been kind to the Flast
decision. In the field of taxpayer standing, it has been limited to very narrow confines.").
52. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615-16 (discussing causation and redressability
requirements in taxpayer standing context); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (same).
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federal taxpayer cases survive a standing inquiry.53
While the Court has been generally unwilling to acknowledge federal
taxpayer standing, the Court has exhibited greater willingness to entertain
taxpayer suits that challenge municipal government action. In Frothingham,
the Court expressly distinguished federal and municipal taxpayers.54 The
Court also suggested that the comparative interest of municipal taxpayers in
the use of their tax dollars is sufficiently "direct and immediate" 1o confer
standing. 55 The Court has not subsequently addressed the standing issue in
connection with a municipal taxpayer case,5 6 but the Court on several
occasions has reiterated the same federal/municipal distinction in the stand-
ing context. 57 In light of such guidance, the lower courts have been signifi-
cantly more lenient in permitting taxpayer challenges to municipal
government action.58
The State Taxpayer Standing Divide
Although the Ohio plaintiffs' complaint stems from an agreement between
Daimler Chrysler, the City of Toledo, and local school board officials, the
complaint does not seek merely to invalidate that agreement. Instead, the
plaintiffs challenge outright the constitutionality of the state statute granting the
investment tax credit that is a subject of the underlying agreement. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs seek standing as state taxpayers and not as federal or municipal
taxpayers. 59 Falling somewhere between federal and municipal taxpayer suits,
state taxpayer challenges present an interesting question: are states more like
municipalities or the federal government for purposes of the standing inquiry?
On this point, the Court has offered mixed signals, which of course have
resulted in confusion among the lower courts.
The Court on several occasions has likened state taxpayers to federal taxpay-
ers in discussing the need for a direct, individual injury to establish standing.60
In Williams v. Riley, decided a few years after Frothingham, the Court consid-
ered whether California taxpayers had standing to contest a state gas tax of three
53. See Staudt, supra note 47, at 800 (noting that the Court rarely grants taxpayer standing to federal
taxpayers).
54. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,486-87 (1923).
55. Id. at 486.
56. See Staudt, supra note 47, at 825-26; Staudt, supra note 46, at 631.
57. See, e.g., ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 613; Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 497-98; Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,445 (1939).
58. See, e.g., PLANS, Inc. v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 319 F.3d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 2003);
see also Staudt, supra note 47, at 827-34 (surveying cases).
59. Although the Court thus far has declined to grant certiorari to consider the Sixth Circuit's
decision regarding the personal property tax waiver, that challenge likewise seeks solely to invalidate a
state statute and, thus, should be viewed as a state taxpayer standing claim rather than a municipal
taxpayer action. See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 613 (1989) (treating constitutional challenge against state
law as involving state taxpayer standing).
60. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1989); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of
Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1942); Williams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78, 79-80 (1929).
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cents per gallon on federal constitutional and statutory grounds. 6 ' Notwithstand-
ing that these taxpayers actually had to pay the excise tax being challenged
(rather than suffer an allegedly higher tax burden as a result of government
spending), the Court in a very brief opinion said that the taxpayer standing
doctrine announced in Frothingham applied to preclude standing in the case at
bar.
6 2
The federal courts have no power per se to review and annul acts of state
Legislatures upon the ground that they conflict with the federal or state
Constitutions. "That question may be considered only when the justification
for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is
made to rest upon such an act."
63
A few decades later, in Doremus v. Board of Education of Hawthorne, the
Court took up a claim by New Jersey taxpayers against a state statute providing
for daily Bible reading in public schools. 64 In considering the taxpayers'
standing, the Court acknowledged its more relaxed approach to municipal
taxpayer standing65 but said of state taxpayer challenges,
[W]e reiterate what the Court said of a federal statute as equally true when a
state Act is assailed: "The party who invokes the power must be able to show,
not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in come [sic] indefinite way in common with people
generally."
6 6
Most recently, in ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, the Court confronted a claim
by Arizona taxpayers that a state statute governing mineral leases was
inconsistent with federal laws originally granting the subject lands to the
state, with the ultimate result that higher taxes were necessary to support the
state's public schools. 6 7 The Court ultimately concluded that the state of
Arizona had standing as the petitioner from a state Supreme Court decision
invalidating the statute.6 8 In explaining its conclusion, however, the Court
additionally discussed at length whether the original plaintiff taxpayers
would have had standing if they had brought the case originally in federal
61. Williams, 280 U.S. at 79.
62. See id. at 79-80.
63. Id. at 80 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923)).
64. See Doremus, 342 U.S. at 430. Although Doremus involves an Establishment Clause claim,
Doremus is still good law notwithstanding Flast v. Cohen at least because the Doremus plaintiff did not
relate the government action in question to taxing and spending. See id. at 434-35.
65. See id. at 434.
66. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
67. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1989).
68. Id. at 623-24.
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district court.6 9 In so doing, the Court expressly analogized state taxpayers
to federal taxpayers and distinguished them from municipal taxpayers: "Yet
we have likened state taxpayers to federal taxpayers, and thus we have
refused to confer standing upon a state taxpayer absent a showing of 'direct
injury,' pecuniary or otherwise." °
Such language supports the view that standing doctrine is the same for both
federal and state taxpayers, which in turn suggests the applicability in both
contexts of Frothingham's general rejection of taxpayer standing with only the
limited Flast exception. Nevertheless, only four of eight participating justices
joined in the ASARCO majority's discussion of the original plaintiffs' standing
in that case.7 t Moreover, other rhetoric of the Court in Frothingham, Doremus,
and Flast arguably indicates greater openness to state taxpayer claims along
lines resembling the municipal taxpayer standing jurisprudence, at least in the
view of the Ninth Circuit.
72
Perhaps because the relevant ASARCO language is dicta, the Doremus case is
widely recognized as offering the principal guidance on the question of state
taxpayer standing. Apart from its language equating federal and state taxpayers,
the Doremus Court identified the principal problem facing the taxpayer's claim
as being that the state statute in question did not involve an identifiable outlay
of public funds other than those otherwise expended to support the public
schools.73 In other words, there was no link between the purportedly illegal
state statute and taxpayer funds and thus no connection between the plaintiff's
status as taxpayer and the alleged wrongdoing. By way of contrast, the Doremus
Court offered the case of Everson v. Board of Education, which involved the use
of public funds to transport children to Catholic parochial schools.74 In distin-
guishing the two cases, the Doremus Court noted that Everson's "measurable
appropriation or disbursement of school-district funds occasioned solely by the
activities complained of' would be sufficient to establish standing.75 The Court
thus concluded its analysis in Doremus with the suggestion that a state taxpayer
could satisfy standing requirements merely by pleading "a good-faith pocket-
book action."76
Both Doremus and Everson are Establishment Clause cases; yet because they
69. Id. at 613-17.
70. Id. at 613-14 (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952)). The
ASARCO Court also discussed the plaintiffs' inability to establish redressability and the abstractness of
non-economic injuries asserted by the plaintiffs. Id. at 614-16.
71. See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 612-17. The remaining four participating justices-Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun-believed that part of the opinion to be unnecessary. Id. at 633-34.
Justice O'Connor did not participate in the ASARCO case.
72. See Arakaki v. Lingle, 423 E3d 954, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169,
1177-81 (9th Cir. 1984).
73. See id. at 433.
74. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952); see Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
75. See Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434 (distinguishing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
76. Id.
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predate Flast v. Cohen, the logical nexus test developed in that latest case
cannot explain the Court's conclusions in the former two. Instead, as the Ninth
Circuit argues, the Court's emphasis on a "measurable appropriation or disburse-
ment of funds" in comparing Doremus and Everson and the Court's reference to
pleading "a good-faith pocketbook action" hints at a relationship among federal,
state, and municipal standing based on "economic relativity.",77 The Frothing-
ham Court's description of federal taxpayer interest in Treasury funds as
minute, indeterminate, and shared with millions is arguably consistent with this
economic relativity theory. The Flast Court likewise alluded to economic
relativity when it cited Doremus for the proposition that, in establishing a
connection between the taxpayer's status as such and the statute being chal-
lenged, "[i]t will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax
funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute."78 By contrast,
the Court in Flast did not mention Doremus in requiring a taxpayer also to show
that the alleged violation involved a constitutional limitation on the taxing and
spending power. Even though the Court in Doremus and elsewhere compared
states to the federal government and distinguished them from municipalities, the
simple fact is that some municipalities are larger in population than many states,
giving taxpayers a relatively similar interest in the use of their tax dollars at the
state and municipal governmental levels. 79 Thus, if doctrinally supportable, an
economic relativity rationale could support treating state and municipal taxpay-
ers similarly.
Hence, the circuit courts of appeal are divided over the relationship among
Frothingham, Doremus, and Flast or, more precisely, what it means for a state
taxpayer suit to be a good-faith pocketbook action. Several circuits have held
77. Hoohuli v. Airyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1178 (1984) ("The difference between state taxpayer
standing and federal taxpayer standing at the time of Doremus, then, was essentially one of economic
relativity.").
78. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
79. This was as true in 1923 as it is today. For example, the 1920 decennial census recognized
5,620,048 residents of New York City, 2,710,705 residents of Chicago, and 1,823,779 residents of
Philadelphia. Including those three, twelve individual cities had populations in excess of 500,000
residents. See Campbell Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the
United States: 1970-1990, http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0027/tab15.txt. By
comparison, more than half of the states had populations smaller than that of Philadelphia, and twelve
states had fewer than 500,000 residents. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, Resident Population by State: 1900-2002, http://www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-04.pdf. The
2000 decennial census similarly recognized 8,008,278 residents of New York City, 3,694,820 residents
of Los Angeles, and 2,896,016 residents of Chicago. Including those three, nine individual cities had
populations of more than 1 million people. See Census 2000 Ranking Tables for Incorporated Places of
100,000 or More: 1990 and 2000, http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t5/tabO2.pdf. By
comparison, twenty states had populations smaller than that of Chicago, and seven states had popula-
tions of fewer than 1 million. See Census 2000 Ranking Tables for States: 1990 and 2000, http://
www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t2/tabOl.pdf. While I do not suggest that the Supreme Court
considered the Census Bureau's population tables in drafting Frothingham, Doremus, or Flast, it seems
highly unlikely that the Justices in any of these cases were unaware that the country's largest cities
contained populations larger than those of many states.
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that, just like federal taxpayers, a state taxpayer must either show, as in Flast,
that the state has appropriated taxpayer dollars in a manner inconsistent with a
particular constitutional limitation on the state's taxing and spending power, or
alternatively establish the direct and individualized injury, such as an in-
creased personal tax burden, otherwise required by Frothingham.80 Like the
Supreme Court, these courts have been reluctant to extend Flast's reasoning
beyond Establishment Clause cases. 8 The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, holds
the view that Flast does not apply in the state taxpayer context at all.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit reads the good-faith pocketbook language of
Doremus and the economic relativity elements of Frothingham, Doremus,
and Flast as requiring a state taxpayer, like a municipal taxpayer, only to
plead with specificity that state taxpayer funds generally have been appropri-
ated and spent in an unconstitutional manner.82 Ultimately, therefore, the
circuit split comes down to whether federal or municipal taxpayer standing
doctrine applies to state taxpayers.
Resolving the Circuit Split
Regardless, resolving the debate over state taxpayer standing doctrine would
render the injury-in-fact element of the standing analysis relatively straight-
forward, at least for the Ohio plaintiffs in Cuno. If state taxpayers are like
municipal taxpayers, then the Cuno plaintiffs have satisfied their burden by
alleging that the investment tax credit reduces the tax burdens of those who
receive it, like DaimlerChrysler, and thus takes away from the Ohio general
fund.83 By contrast, if state taxpayers are like federal taxpayers, and Flast v.
Cohen applies, it seems highly unlikely that the Court would recognize the
80. See Bd. of Educ. of the Mt. Sinai Union Free Sch. Dist. v. N.Y. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 60 F.3d
106, 111 (2d Cir. 1995); Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1401 (10th Cir. 1992);
Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 918-19 (6th Cir. 1988); Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271, 1277 &
n.16 (5th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit explicitly disavows Flast's applicability in the state taxpayer
context. See Colo. Taxpayers Union, 963 F.2d at 1399. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit similarly
distinguishes between Establishment Clause and other cases and adopts precisely the same approach to
state taxpayer standing as the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits in the non-Establishment Clause
context. See id. at 1401.
81. See, e.g., Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849, 852-54 (8th Cir. 2002) (declining to extend Flast v.
Cohen to grant state taxpayer challenge on Equal Protection Clause grounds); Tarsney v. O'Keefe, 225
F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 2002) (same with Free Exercise Clause challenge); Taub, 842 F.2d at 918-19
(same with suit alleging Article I, section 10 and due process violations).
82. See Arakaki v. Lingle, 423 F3d 954, 971-73 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169,
1178-81 (9th Cir. 1984).
83. Tax cuts are routinely characterized as government spending. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro,
Rethinking Tax Expenditures, 57 TAx L. REv. 187, 191 (2004) (equating spending dollars with tax cut
dollars); Zelinsky, supra note 3 (comparing tax incentives and direct subsidies). Politicians and
economists argue over whether economic development in the vein of the DaimlerChrysler plant leads to
additional revenue collections sufficient to offset the investment tax credit decrease; but it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court would pursue such economic analysis in evaluating standing. Compare
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 773 & n.4 (1984) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (analyzing economic linkage
between tax exemption and proliferation of private schools) with id. at 758 & n.23 (rejecting Justice
Brennan's economic analysis).
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standing of the Cuno plaintiffs to challenge the Ohio investment tax credit.
Cuno is not an Establishment Clause case, and while Flast by its own terms is
not limited to Establishment Clause cases, the Commerce Clause seems an odd
candidate for extending Flast's applicability.
84
Unfortunately for the Ohio plaintiffs, the majority rule is the superior reading
of the Court's discussion to date of state taxpayer standing. The Court has
unequivocally, if infrequently, compared federal and state taxpayers and ex-
pressed the view that state taxpayers must show a direct and individualized
injury to establish standing. The Court in Williams v. Reilly clearly applied the
Frothingham standard to deny state taxpayer standing; in both Doremus and
ASARCO, the Court expressly made the same comparison and reiterated the
direct injury requirement. Although Justice Kennedy's discussion in ASARCO
did not enjoy majority support, the dissenters did not express disagreement with
his analysis but rather their view that it was unnecessary to resolve the case at
bar.85 By contrast, the comparison with Everson and the good-faith pocketbook
reference in the Doremus opinion may lend themselves to the Ninth Circuit's
broader interpretation when considered in isolation; but when placed in the
context of the Court's more explicit association of federal and state taxpayers
and the direct injury requirement, the narrower reading adopted by the other
circuits seems more likely. In short, the Ninth Circuit relies on snippets of
rhetoric taken at least partly out of context to support its theory of state taxpayer
standing, while the other circuits take the Court's more explicit statements at
face value.
Moreover, upon careful reading of the relevant cases, the Ninth Circuit's
economic relativity explanation for the distinction between federal and munici-
pal taxpayers seems largely invented, even when one acknowledges the bits of
84. Whereas the Establishment Clause expressly limits the scope of congressional action, the
Commerce Clause on its face grants rather than limits federal legislative power and says nothing about
state taxing and spending authority. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make now law
respecting an establishment of religion...") with U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have
Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the several States ... "). The Court has inferred from the
Commerce Clause a limitation on state action that discriminates against interstate commerce; but,
unlike the Establishment Clause, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is rooted in
structural rather than individual rights concerns. See Bo~is I. BiTrrrR AND BRANNON P. DENING, BiTrKER
ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §6.01 [B] (characterizing dormant Commerce
Clause analysis as a "judicial allocation of the burden of [congressional] inertia"); see also Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (describing the Establishment Clause in personal liberty terms). But
see generally Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IowA L. REv. 1 (1998) (acknowledging the common understanding of the Establishment
Clause as securing individual rights but arguing instead for reading the Establishment Clause as a
structural provision regulating the boundary between government and religion). To the extent that the
dormant Commerce Clause secures any right, it is the "'right' to engage in interstate trade free from
restrictive state regulation." Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) (discussing structural versus
individual rights implications of Commerce Clause). This right obviously is not implicated with respect
to the taxpayer plaintiffs in this case.
85. Moreover, none of the dissenters in ASARCO remains on the Court today. See discussion supra
note 71.
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language on which the Ninth Circuit relies. The Court has never used the phrase
"economic relativity" in connection with taxpayer standing. The Doremus Court
focused on the fact that Doremus had failed to allege that any taxpayer funds
were involved at all in the challenged state action. The Frothingham Court
likewise emphasized a wholly different basis for distinguishing between federal
and municipal taxpayers and denying standing to the former.
In fact, the Frothingham Court's primary emphasis in distinguishing federal
and municipal taxpayers was the nature of the legal relationship between
taxpayers and the different levels of government, irrespective of economics. The
Court noted expressly as the reason for recognizing municipal taxpayer standing
"the peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the [municipal] corporation,
which is not without some resemblance to that subsisting between stockholder
and private corporation. 86 For this proposition, the Court cited a theory known
as Dillon's Rule.87 Named for John Forest Dillon, an Iowa Supreme Court
Justice and prominent nineteenth-century scholar of local government law,
Dillon's Rule maintains that, like a private corporation, a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise only those powers expressly granted to it by the state
under which it is organized and that grants its charter.88 The Rule relied on
Dillon's presumption that municipal corporations have no authority and, indeed,
would not even exist but for state-level government. Accordingly, the appropri-
ate scope of municipal power was a pure question of legal interpretation, subject
to judicial review like any other. Viewed in this light, granting municipal
taxpayers standing to challenge municipal exercise of taxing and spending
powers seems wholly reasonable. In fact, one of the primary effects of Dillon's
Rule is "to shift the decision about the scope of local authority from political
institutions ... to the courts."89
By contrast, established legal doctrine of both that era and now held that
states, like the federal government, are sovereign entities whose actions are only
reviewable on a comparatively limited basis.90 In saying this, I am not suggest-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment bars Charlotte Cuno and her fellow plaintiffs
from suing the state of Ohio in this case. Rather, I contend only that the
Frothingham Court distinguished municipalities from the federal government
not on grounds of economic relativity but rather on the basis of a theory that
views municipalities as something other than sovereign entities. The states, like
86. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
87. See id. (citing 4 DILLON, COMMErNTmIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICI'AL CORPORATIONS § 1580 et seq.
(Sth ed. 1911)).
88. See 4 DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1580 et seq. (5th ed.
1911); see also Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions be Accorded Eleventh Amendment
Immunity?, 43 DEPAuL L. REv. 577, 590 (1994); Bruce P. Frohnen, The One and the Many: Individual
Rights, Corporate Rights and the Diversity of Groups, 107 W. VA. L. REv. 789, 833 (2005).
89. Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or Can Public Choice Theory Justify
Local Government Law?, 67 Ctu.-KENT L. REv. 959,966 (1991).
90. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, §§
7.1, 7.3.
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the federal government, are sovereign entities. Accordingly, the Frothingham
Court's rationale for denying standing to federal taxpayers but not municipal
taxpayers should apply equally to state taxpayers; it makes little sense to
distinguish federal and state taxpayers on economic relativity grounds if the
federal versus municipal distinction is not similarly premised.
I am also not advocating Dillon's Rule as a foundation for contemporary
legal analysis. Dillon's view of the nature of municipal government was never
universally accepted. The eminent Thomas Cooley, for one, suggested that
municipal governments hold inherent rights independent of the state. Moreover,
with the expansion of Home Rule and local government assumption of greater
responsibilities, scholars question the continued viability of Dillon's Rule. 9'
Regardless, in comparing the relationship of a municipality and its taxpayers to
that of a corporation and its shareholders, the Frothingham Court both espoused
Dillon's theory of the nature of the municipal corporation and cited Dillon's
treatise as support.92 Whether or not that theory is worth revisiting, the Frothing-
ham Court's reliance on Dillon's Rule to justify municipal taxpayer standing
undercuts extending Frothingham to adopt a more lenient standing doctrine for
state taxpayers on economic relativity grounds.
It is important to recognize that embracing a narrow approach to state
taxpayer standing would not operate to deny altogether judicial review of claims
like those of the Ohio plaintiffs, but rather would merely return such challenges
to the state courts or require different non-taxpayer plaintiffs to raise a federal
court claim. 93 Following the majority of the circuits in adopting a strict view of
state taxpayer standing thus would be consistent with several other trends in the
Court's jurisprudence vis a vis the states. In cases over the last few decades, the
Court has repeatedly acknowledged the need to respect the rights of states to
govern affairs traditionally left to them and the corresponding limitations that
such regard must impose upon federal governmental actors,94 not least the
federal judiciary.95 In addition to giving heft to the Constitution's federalist
91. See, e.g., Durchslag, supra note 88; Gillette, supra note 89 (summarizing the scholarship).
92. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477,487 (1923).
93. For example, competitors of DaimlerChrysler who do business in Ohio but choose to develop
physical plants elsewhere may be better positioned than the Cuno plaintiffs to challenge the Ohio
investment tax credit on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. See, e.g., Bacchus Imp., Ltd. v. Diaz, 468
U.S. 263, 267 (allowing in-state liquor wholesalers who would be directly liable for tax and whose
imports would be subject to tax on out-of-state producers to challenge the tax); Boston Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (permitting out-of-state stock exchanges with New York
business to challenge discriminatorily-applied transfer tax on stock sales with New York nexus).
94. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997) ("[S]tate legislatures are not subject to
federal direction."); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
95. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997) ("Warnings against
premature adjudication of constitutional questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is
asked to invalidate a State's law, for the federal tribunal risks friction-generating error when it
endeavors to construe a novel state Act not yet reviewed by the State's highest court."); see also Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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principles, the Court has also reinvigorated the Tenth Amendment as a limita-
tion on Congress's ability to impose obligations on state governments 96 and
reemphasized Eleventh Amendment support for state sovereign immunity.97 As
the ASARCO Court acknowledged, when and if the state court system invali-
dates a state law as violating the United States Constitution, the state will have
standing to appeal that decision to the United States Supreme Court.98 Particu-
larly in cases such as this one where the plaintiffs raise state constitutional and
statutory claims as well as federal constitutional ones, allowing state courts the
first opportunity to consider state taxpayer challenges to state laws is consistent
both with the federal standing principles and with the Court's reenergized
respect for state governmental institutions generally.
CAUSATION, REDRESSABILITY, AND PRUDENTIAL STANDING
Although the Court could use Cuno as a vehicle for resolving the circuit split
over the kind and degree of injury required for state taxpayer standing, such a
decision is unnecessary to reverse the Sixth Circuit on the basis of standing. If
the Court is in a particularly minimalist mood,99 it could just as easily rely on
the other constitutionally-required causation and redressability elements or on
prudential standing zone-of-interests analysis to dispose of the case without
breaking new doctrinal ground. The cases dealing with taxpayer standing have
not eliminated these requirements in that context;' °° and the Cuno plaintiffs'
allegations, even if true, raise important questions with respect to each.
Causation
The causation requirement for constitutional standing requires that the injury
alleged by the plaintiff be caused by the purportedly wrongful action of the defen-
dant.10 ' While an injury can be indirect and still suffice for causation purposes,"° a
causal relationship that is too remote, attenuated, or speculative will be inadequate to
confer standing.'0 3 Instead, the plaintiffs must allege facts fairly tracing their injuries
to the defendants' allegedly wrongful actions.1t 4 Consequently, establishing causation
96. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. 898; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
97. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62;
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
98. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1989).
99. See Brannon P. Denning, Cuno and the Court: The Case for Minimalism, 4 GEo. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 33 (2006).
100. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989) (examining state taxpayer claim
for causation and redressability).
101. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,505-06 (1975).
102. See id. at 504-05 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
103. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26,42-43 (1976).
104. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 41; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 (employing similar language to
describe the causation element of constitutional standing).
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is particularly difficult where the plaintiffs' purported injury arises from governmental
regulation of yet another party's conduct. 10 5
For Kim's Auto and Truck Services, there is little doubt that the dislocation of
Kim's business is traceable to DaimlerChrysler's decision to locate its new
facility in Toledo and the City's actions in condemning Kim's property on
DaimlerChrysler's behalf. But that is not the question before the Court because,
at least with respect to the Ohio investment tax credit, Kim's has not contested
either of these actions as such. 10 6 Instead, Kim's has opted for a broader
challenge to the constitutionality of the Ohio investment tax credit. Accordingly,
the causation question before the Court is whether the provision of that tax
incentive to DaimlerChrysler is responsible for DaimlerChrysler's decision and
the displacement of Kim's business.'07
The Supreme Court has declined to find causation in similar circum-
stances. For example, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, the Court considered whether an Internal Revenue Service ruling
allowing hospitals to deny more than emergency services to indigent citi-
zens and still retain tax exempt status in fact caused hospitals in the
plaintiffs' area to deny the plaintiffs non-emergency care.' 08 The plaintiffs
claimed that, but for the ruling, the hospitals would be more likely to
provide the plaintiffs with additional services.' 0 9 Given all the factors that a
hospital might consider in electing to pursue such a policy and evidence
suggesting the variability of hospital dependence upon the special tax
benefits conferred by exempt status, the Court considered the link between
the IRS ruling and the hospitals' actions too speculative to satisfy the
causation element of constitutional standing. "0
Likewise, in Allen v. Wright, the Court contemplated whether an IRS grant of
tax exempt status to certain racially discriminatory private schools caused the
public schools attended by the plaintiffs' children to be racially segregated.11'
The Court considered speculative whether the withdrawal of such status would
cause the schools in question to change their discriminatory policies or lead
105. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 505.
106. The other claims not currently before the Court-that the personal property tax waiver violates
the dormant Commerce Clause and that both the investment tax credit and the personal property tax
waiver violate the equal protection clause of the Ohio state constitution-all likewise challenge only
the validity of state statutory provisions. See discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text. Only one
of the plaintiffs' claims, that the City of Toledo and DaimlerChrysler failed to conform to the statutory
requirements of O.R.C. § 5709.62, challenged more directly the actions of the City of Toledo and
DaimlerChrysler. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 14-15. The plaintiffs did not appeal the District
Court's dismissal of that issue to the Sixth Circuit, however; and, consequently, that claim is not
presently before the Supreme Court. See discussion supra note 15.
107. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-60 (finding injury not fairly traceable to defendant's action because
of intervening actors); Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-43 (same).
108. Simon, 426 U.S. at 42-43.
109. Id. at 42.
110. Id.
111. Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-58.
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parents to decide to send their children to public instead of private schools.112
Moreover, the Court questioned whether the number of private school officials
or parents affected by the IRS's action was sufficiently large to alter the racial
composition of the plaintiffs' public schools." 
3
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. offers an
interesting contrast to these cases and the one at bar. In Duke Power, the Court
considered whether the Price-Anderson Act, which limited liability for nuclear
accidents at private nuclear power plants operating under federal license, caused
Duke Power Co. to build and operate a nuclear power plant near the plaintiffs'
homes and, in turn, caused them to suffer various alleged injuries.' 1 4 The Court
observed that Congress had enacted the Price-Anderson Act to mitigate enor-
mous economic liability concerns that were discouraging private companies
from building nuclear power plants.1 5 In finding the causation element satis-
fied, the Court in Duke Power cited evidence of the power companies' "categori-
cal unwillingness to participate in the development of nuclear power absent
guarantees of a limitation on their liability" to conclude that there was a
"substantial likelihood" that Duke Power Co. would not have built and would




In short, the causation inquiry in cases like Cuno is largely an assessment of
probable outcomes regarding the behavior of independent actors. When fit into
the pattern of these cases, Kim's ability to demonstrate causation seems un-
likely. Certainly, the legislative and executive branch officials responsible for
the tax breaks at issue in this case prefer to believe that they serve a useful
purpose. It is entirely speculative, however, whether the Ohio investment tax
credit actually influenced DaimlerChrysler's decision. DaimlerChrysler already
had a facility in Toledo, making that city an obvious choice for expansion,'
1 7
and the agreement between DaimlerChrysler and the City provided for several
inducements beyond the investment tax credit. 1 18 Both facts suggest a substan-
tial likelihood that DaimlerChrysler would have chosen to invest in Toledo
regardless of the availability of the investment tax credit.
In addition, as documented by Professor Peter Enrich, lead counsel for the
Cuno plaintiffs, much econometric and other empirical research suggests that
DaimlerChrysler would have pursued the same course of action irrespective of
the Ohio investment tax credit. 1 9 Based on that research, Enrich contends that
tax incentives have little or no influence on a decision to locate new business in
one place over another, and instead maintains that such programs serve the
112. Id. at 758.
113. Id.
114. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
115. Id. at 63-64 (discussing Price-Anderson Act history).
116. Id. at 75, 77.
117. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 6-7.
118. See id. at ex. A.
119. See Enrich, supra note 2, at 390-92.
[Vol. 4:47
How DID WE GET HERE ANYWAY?
primarily political purpose of showing voters that their government officials are
actively pursuing new business development. 20 Enrich's analysis suggests that
the investment tax credit was of substantially less economic value to Daimler-
Chrysler even than the Court assumed was true of tax exempt status in Eastern
Kentucky and Allen.
It is undoubtedly true that DaimlerChrysler inquired about available tax
incentives and endeavored to satisfy the requirements for the investment tax
credit in developing its new facility in Toledo, as would any business seeking
the best deal it can get for a planned course of action. But Kim's has alleged no
facts to suggest that DaimlerChrysler would not have made the same decision
absent the investment tax credit. In fact, both the facts of this case and the
potential that Ohio would have found some other method of subsidizing Daimler-
Chrysler suggest at least as great a likelihood that DaimlerChrysler would have
developed its new facility in Toledo anyway. Based on the complaint as filed,
the line between Kim's injuries and the Ohio investment tax credit provision is
simply too speculative to satisfy the causation element for constitutional stand-
ing.
Causation is even more tenuous for the other plaintiffs. The Ohio plaintiffs
assume that, but for the investment tax credit, the Ohio general fund would have
received more tax revenues that Ohio state government officials would have
used to the Ohio plaintiffs' benefit. The Ohio plaintiffs also assume that, in the
absence of the Ohio investment tax credit, their contributions to the state's
general fund would have been lower, in proportionate if not absolute terms. The
Michigan plaintiffs allege an even longer causal chain involving (1) Daimler-
Chrysler locating its new facility in Michigan rather than Ohio, plus (2)
Michigan state and local governments receiving additional tax revenues from
that new facility, and (3) those governments using such added funds for the
Michigan plaintiffs' benefit.
As discussed above, the Court has been willing on some occasions to find
causation where the government action in question probably if indirectly caused
the plaintiffs' injury. 21 The plaintiffs' assertions here are highly speculative,
however. There is no basis for blaming the Ohio investment tax credit for the
plaintiffs' relative tax burden or the limitations on their respective governments'
budgets. State legislatures in either Michigan or Ohio could have granted an
alternative package of direct and indirect subsidies to DaimlerChrysler or even
merely lowered state franchise rates. Even if we assume that, but for the
investment tax credit, more tax revenue would have flowed into government
coffers (whether in Ohio or Michigan), policy makers face many demands for
the limited resources under their control, and the probability that those officials
would channel additional funds to the benefit of the plaintiffs' cannot be high.
120. Id. at 393-94.
121. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75-77 (1978); see also
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977).
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Particularly in the case of the Michigan plaintiffs, the sheer number of parties
and contingencies upon which their causal chain relies makes it unlikely that the
existence of the investment tax credit means fewer government benefits to them.
Indeed, the mere fact that both the Michigan and Ohio plaintiffs essentially lay
claim to the same tax dollars that eliminating the investment tax credit would
allegedly raise suggests the purely hypothetical nature of the causal relationship
they assert.
Redressability
The redressability analysis in Cuno strongly resembles the causation discus-
sion above. The redressability element of constitutional standing demands that a
plaintiff demonstrate that the requested relief is likely to redress the injury
claimed. 22 For this purpose, it is not enough to speculate that the remedy
sought might alleviate the injury alleged. Instead, the plaintiff must adduce facts
showing substantial probability of that outcome.'23 As with causation, satisfy-
ing the redressability requirement is especially hard where, as here, the "plain-
tiff's asserted injury arises from the government's alleged unlawful regulation
(or lack of regulation) of someone else." 24 In such cases, redressability "de-
pends upon the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the
courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot
presume either to control or to predict."125
In analyzing redressability, the Court must consider the facts as they existed
at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint, as opposed to the present time.
1 26
Regardless, because the only remedy sought is the invalidation of the Ohio
Revenue Code provision that permits the investment tax credit, the Cuno
plaintiffs' complaint comes nowhere near satisfying the redressability require-
ment for constitutional standing.
The claim raised by Kim's Auto and Truck Services most obviously fails to
establish standing on redressability grounds. The sole remedial goal of the Cuno
litigation is the invalidation of and injunction against the Ohio Revenue Code provi-
sion that permits the investment tax credit. For such relief to alleviate the dislocation
losses purportedly suffered by Kim's, one would have to assume that enjoining the
Ohio investment tax credit's application to DaimlerChrysler would cause the City of
Toledo and DaimlerChrysler to change their plans with respect to Kim's property. To
122. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) ("[T]he relevant inquiry is
whether ... the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.").
123. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 504 (1975) ("Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that...
there is a substantial probability that .. . if the court affords the relief requested, [the injury] of the
petitioners will be removed.").
124. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., id. at 569 n.4 (citing and quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S.
826, 830 (1989)).
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the contrary, the fact that DaimlerChrysler already had a plant in Toledo and received
a range of other unchallenged assistance from the City as part of their agreement
renders it at least as likely that Kim's would have been dislocated regardless of the
investment tax credit. 127 It is unlikely, therefore, that a judicial decision to grant the
remedy Kim's seeks will eliminate Kim's injury.
Such lack of nexus between the injury claimed and remedy sought is ordi-
narily fatal to a standing claim. 128 For example, in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., the
Court denied standing to a single mother seeking criminal prosecution for
failure to pay child support because sending the child's father to jail would in no
way resolve the financial injury that inspired the complaint.12 9 Likewise, in
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the plaintiffs alleged injuries
caused by the defendant's failure to provide them in a timely fashion with
information about toxic chemicals released into their environment, but sued for
such relief as civil penalties and the right to inspect the defendants' books and
records in the future.' 30 Noting that the relief sought would not compensate the
plaintiffs for losses caused by past late reporting, the Court denied standing. 131
While the owners of Kim's may feel personal gratification at seeing the invest-
ment tax credit declared unconstitutional, such generalized relief cannot satisfy
the redressability requirement for standing. 132
The facts alleged by both the Ohio and Michigan plaintiffs also are inadequate to
show that the injuries alleged are likely to be redressed by a decision invalidating the
Ohio investment tax credit provision. The Ohio plaintiffs allege that the Ohio invest-
ment tax credit deprived their state government of tax revenues and shifted the burden
of supporting government spending to them. 13 3 To satisfy redressability, a determina-
tion by the Court that the Ohio investment tax credit is unconstitutional would have to
remedy that alleged burden shifting. The likelihood of that outcome depends upon
both DaimlerChrysler and state legislators and other government officials responding
(or failing to respond) to such a decision by the Court in a manner that increases state
tax revenues both overall and reduces the Ohio plaintiffs' relative share of that total
tax burden. In fact, Ohio has responded to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cuno
precisely by offering more direct subsidies to businesses, actions which belie the Ohio
plaintiffs' claims. 34 In Allen v. Wright and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, the Court declared the likelihood that private parties would respond in a
particular manner to a denial of tax exempt status as too speculative to establish
127. See discussion supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) ("Relief that does not
remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the
redressability requirement."); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973).
129. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618.
130. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105-09.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 107.
133. Complaint, supra note 14, at 11.
134. See Zelinsky, supra note 3, at 861 (noting testimony of Ohio's Lieutenant Governor that Ohio
has already responded to the Sixth Circuit's decision in this way).
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redressability as well as causation. 135 In ASARCO, the Court expressed even less
confidence in its ability to predict the policy decisions of state governmental actors.136
The Ohio plaintiffs' contentions are comparable to the situations in these cases and
thus are inadequate to satisfy the redressability requirement.
The Michigan plaintiffs' plan for remedying their hypothetical lost govern-
ment benefits is even less likely to come true. 13 7 To satisfy redressability, the
Michigan plaintiffs would have to allege facts demonstrating substantial likeli-
hood that (1) a decision invalidating the Ohio investment tax credit would have
prompted DaimlerChrysler to develop its facility in Michigan rather than Ohio;
(2) the consequent facility would result in increased tax revenues to those state
and local governments (who may well have been offering their own tax
incentives to lure DaimlerChrysler to Michigan); and finally (3) those governmen-
tal entities would have employed such additional tax revenues to the Michigan
plaintiffs' benefit rather than for other purposes.
Even if the Court declared the Ohio investment tax credit to be unconstitu-
tional, the Michigan plaintiffs have offered no facts even to suggest that
DaimlerChrysler or the various governmental actors involved would follow
the Michigan plaintiffs' wishes. Again, the facts and circumstances of this
case-DaimlerChrysler's existing facility in Toledo, the other benefits of-
fered to DaimlerChrysler for its expansion in that city, and the empirical
research suggesting that tax incentives are more politically symbolic than
economically influential-all make it most likely that DaimlerChrysler would
have pursued the same course of action with or without the investment tax
credit. 138 The Ohio state and local governmental officials likely would have
responded to an adverse judicial decision by offering DaimlerChrysler other
subsidies. ' Moreover, the relevant Michigan state and local governments
are not party to the Cuno case, and the remedy the Michigan plaintiffs seek
would not bind these governments to any course of action (other than
possibly examining their own tax incentive programs).1 40 Given the many
uses to which state and local governments put additional tax revenues, there
is a substantial likelihood that the Michigan plaintiffs would receive no
benefit whatsoever from any additional tax revenues.141 In short, the Michi-
gan plaintiffs' claim to redressability is even more conjectural than that of
the Ohio plaintiffs. Such speculation as to what might have been is simply
135. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
42-44 (1976).
136. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1995).
137. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 11-12.
138. See discussion supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
139. See discussion supra note 134 and accompanying text.
140. See Joshua S. Smith & John D. Miller, The Economics of Business Attraction: Are Beneficial
Michigan Tax Incentives in Jeopardy After Sixth Circuit Court Ruling?, 84 SF, MicH. BAR J. 16 (2005).
141. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989) ("[I]t is pure speculation whether the
lawsuit would result in any actual tax relief .... [I]t is conceivable that ... the State might reduce its
supplement from the general funds to provide for other programs.").
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inadequate to establish redressability.142
Prudential Standing: Zone of Interests
Finally, prudential limitations on standing even beyond those constitutionally
required offer yet one more basis for denying the Cuno plaintiffs standing.
Beyond the taxpayer standing doctrines discussed above, which may or may not
be prudentially based, another relevant, prudential inquiry known as the "zone
of interests test" may be relevant in this case. The zone of interests test requires
analysis of "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by" the
constitutional or statutory provision upon which the complainant's claim rests. 
143
Thus, to satisfy this prudential requirement, the Cuno plaintiffs must demon-
strate that the Commerce Clause protects or regulates the interests that they
assert. 144
The Court has recognized the purpose of the Commerce Clause as to enable
citizens of the various states "to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory
taxes" imposed by other states.' 45 For example, in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Comnission, six stock exchanges located outside of New York challenged a New
York statute that imposed a larger transfer tax on out-of-state securities sales with a
New York connection than on like in-state securities sales.' 46 The plaintiffs contended
that the state tax provision in question was intended to and did divert business from
their facilities to exchanges located in New York. The Court consequently found that,
by asserting their right and that of their members to pursue interstate commerce
without the burden of discriminatory taxation and alleging that the challenged tax
interfered with that right, the plaintiffs were "arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected" by the Commerce Clause.' 47
By contrast, none of the Cuno plaintiffs claim to be engaged in interstate
142. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568-71 (1992) (concluding that any relief against
the Secretary of Interior would not necessarily lead to the termination of funding on the part of funding
agencies).
143. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75
(1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
144. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 321 n.3 (1977); Ass'n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., 397 U.S. at 153-54.
145. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 321 n. 3; see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,
469-70 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (discussing the zone protected by the dormant Commerce Clause).
Although the majority in Wyoming v. Oklahoma allowed the State of Wyoming to pursue a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge even though the State was not itself involved in interstate commerce, the
Court's opinion in that case emphasized the "seriousness" of Wyoming's need as a sovereign entity to
defend its "sovereign capacity" to collect tax revenues against adverse actions of another state acting
also "in its sovereign capacity." Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 451 (comparing the case at bar with other
Commerce Clause disputes between states). In DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, by contrast, the only state
actors are defendants.
146. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 319-20.
147. Id. at 321 n.3. The Court recognized that the plaintiff exchanges had standing to raise the same
claim both on their own behalf and as representatives of their respective members. Id.
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commerce, nor do they claim that granting the investment tax credit to Daimler-
Chrysler in any way interferes with their participation in interstate commerce.
Kim's Auto and Truck Services alleges the right to be free of losses from the
displacement of its business caused indirectly by the Ohio investment tax
credit.' 48 The Ohio plaintiffs seek to avoid a higher share of the overall tax
liability imposed by their own state government. 149 The Michigan plaintiffs
assert a claim to hypothetical benefits from possible additional tax revenues
allegedly made unavailable by the influence of Ohio's investment tax credit.
150
Although the Court has at times interpreted the zone of interests test quite
broadly, 5' the rights that the Cuno plaintiffs assert, however valid they might
be generally, are neither protected nor regulated by the Commerce Clause.
PREDICTIONS
In sum, it seems highly unlikely that the Cuno case will survive a standing
inquiry. The only question is on which ground the Court will choose to deny
standing.
The Cuno case certainly presents an opportunity for the Court to offer
guidance on the question of the kind and degree of injury a state taxpayer must
allege to have standing. If the Court pursues that objective, the narrower
majority rule seems more likely to prevail than the Ninth Circuit's more lax
approach. Resolving the circuit split in the former fashion would follow broader
trends in respecting state prerogatives reflected by the Court's federalism and
state sovereign immunity decisions and would be consistent with new Chief
Justice John Roberts's purportedly minimalist jurisprudential approach.
Unfortunately, settling the circuit split over the kind and degree of injury
necessary for state taxpayer standing will not entirely dispose of the case at bar.
Neither Kim's Auto and Truck Services nor the Michigan plaintiffs rely on their
status as taxpayers of Ohio to challenge that state's investment tax credit; Kim's
at least has asserted a cognizable injury-in-fact independent of its status as an
Ohio taxpayer. By contrast, the claims raised by all of the Cuno plaintiffs should
fail on grounds of causation, redressability, or prudential standing based on the
zone-of-interests test. Resolving the state taxpayer standing question represents
the least efficient or minimalist of all the possible standing doctrine grounds.
The Court's approach to the Curo case thus far suggests that the Court hopes to
overturn the Sixth Circuit's decision in the least assertive manner possible. Accord-
ingly, the most likely outcome seems to be that the Court will reverse the Sixth Circuit
on standing grounds but leave the state taxpayer standing split unresolved.
148. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 11.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 11-12.
151. See, e.g., Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 491 (1998);
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987).
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